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Apolitical redistricting is an impossibility. To refer to a process 
or institution as “political” is merely to use an empty epithet. A 
redistricting process can be criticized as “political” on one of two 
bases—the individuals to whom authority is delegated, or the 
geographical algorithms used by those who have redistricting 
authority. Given that elections in the United States are based around 
the winner-take-all principle, any redistricting plan will create 
winners and losers. Therefore, the choice between any set of 
redistricting algorithms is a choice about who will be winners and 
who will be losers. Furthermore, because the delegation of 
responsibility for redistricting is only relevant inasmuch as it affects 
the choice of redistricting algorithms, the choice of delegation is also 
a determination of who will win and who will lose. By definition, 
that choice cannot be apolitical. Moreover, any attempt to evaluate 
redistricting processes independently of such outcomes devolves the 
process into a trivial exercise in Nomic. 
APOLITICAL REDISTRICTING: ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY VS. 
ALGORITHMIC APPROACHES 
Complaints about the “political” nature of the redistricting 
process generally fall into two categories: complaints about who has 
the authority to redraw lines, and complaints about the geographic 
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algorithms used to redraw district lines. With respect to the first 
complaint, the United States is unique among countries with single-
member districts because of the frequency with which partisan 
officials are granted the authority to redraw district lines. The most 
common allocation of responsibility is to delegate redistricting 
authority to the state legislature, where redistricting plans are treated 
like any other piece of legislation. Although partisan officials have a 
vested interest in the placement of district lines, that does not mean 
that they necessarily face a conflict of interest. In fact, they face a 
confluence of interest—they have political incentives to draw lines in 
a way that actually benefits voters.1 Nevertheless, it is possible to 
delegate authority to those without a stake in the process, be they 
judges, “special masters,” or mechanical scoring systems for 
independently submitted plans. 
However, an apolitical algorithm is another matter altogether. 
More than any other aspect of electoral rulemaking, the placement of 
district lines determines election results because party identification is 
the strongest determinant of vote choice. Because any election can 
only have a single winner, every redistricting plan creates a set of 
winners and losers. Therefore, the choice between any two 
redistricting algorithms is a choice between two sets of winners and 
losers. Further, not only do all redistricting plans create winners and 
losers, they all do so based on politically relevant criteria. Thus, all 
redistricting plans can be considered “gerrymanders” and an apolitical 
redistricting algorithm is impossible. Moreover, because the 
delegation of redistricting authority affects the algorithm that will be 
used, it follows that the choice of who should have redistricting 
authority is indistinguishable from the choice of which algorithms to 
use. Thus, the choice of delegation is itself a choice between winners 
and losers, and apolitical redistricting is fundamentally impossible. 
This essay will examine the three broad categories of redistricting 
algorithms: the partisan gerrymander, the bipartisan gerrymander, and 
the competitive gerrymander. The essay will examine who wins and 
who loses under each approach, and demonstrate that the choice of 
algorithms is indistinguishable from the question of who should win 
 
 1. Justin Buchler, The Redistricting Process Should Be Nonpartisan: Con, in DEBATING 
REFORM 161 (Richard Ellis & Michael Nelson eds., 2010) [hereinafter Buchler, The 
Redistricting Process]. 
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and who should lose. Then, because the delegation of authority affects 
the choice of algorithms, it follows that the delegation decision is also 
a choice about who should win and who should lose. Thus, there can 
be no apolitical redistricting in any meaningful sense of the term 
because the choice of delegation is as “political” as the choice of 
algorithm. 
THE MANY FACES OF GERRYMANDERING 
The term “gerrymander” has been used so often and in so many 
disparate contexts that it no longer has a specific meaning. In modern 
political discourse, it is little more than an epithet attached to any 
redistricting plan by which someone feels aggrieved. Because all 
redistricting plans create some aggrieved group, all redistricting plans 
can be considered gerrymanders. 
The origin of the term “gerrymandering” does not need to be 
recounted here. Historically, the redistricting algorithm to which the 
label is most commonly attached is the partisan gerrymander. A 
partisan gerrymander uses a “pack and crack” strategy, so labeled 
because of how it groups a disadvantaged party’s voters. For example, 
if Republicans were to attempt a partisan gerrymander, they would do 
so by packing one set of districts with inefficiently large Democratic 
supermajorities. In the remaining districts, they would combine 
relatively thin Republican majorities with relatively large Democratic 
minorities, thereby “cracking” the minority.  Doing so maximizes the 
efficiency with which Republican voters are allocated to districts, and 
minimizes the efficiency with which Democratic voters are allocated 
to districts. In doing so, the “pack and crack” plan allows Republicans 
to win a greater share of the seats than their proportion of the vote. 
Of course, the partisan gerrymander is not the only type of 
gerrymander. “Good government” advocates also deride the 
bipartisan gerrymander, otherwise known as an incumbent protection 
gerrymander. Under a bipartisan gerrymander, each party’s voters are 
packed inefficiently into separate sets of districts. Hence, every district 
has either an inefficiently large Democratic supermajority, or an 
inefficiently large Republican supermajority. The result is that 
incumbents face no threat of loss in the general election, and each 
party is guaranteed a number of seats that they cannot go far above 
or below. 
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Because the partisan gerrymander spreads one party’s voters out 
as efficiently as possible and the bipartisan gerrymander spreads each 
party’s voters out with equal inefficiency, by mathematical necessity, 
the default alternative to either approach is a plan that does not pack 
any district with voters of either party. Each district (or at least as 
many districts as possible) in such a plan combines equal numbers of 
Democrats and Republicans so that neither party has an efficiency 
advantage, and incumbents of neither party are protected from 
general election challenges by the partisan contours of their districts. 
The frequently explicit and sometimes implicit objective of advocates 
of an “apolitical” approach to redistricting is usually to make such 
plans more common based on the either implicit or explicit belief that 
such a plan is itself apolitical. This approach, however, also creates 
winners and losers—it will advantage some, and disadvantage others. 
As such, the “apolitical” approach is equally deserving of the 
pejorative label, “gerrymander.” Such plans should be known as 
“competitive gerrymanders.” 
WINNERS AND LOSERS UNDER EACH ALGORITHM 
In the context of redistricting, process only matters insofar as it 
promotes preferable outcomes. Any redistricting algorithm will create 
a set of winners and a set of losers. The choice of a redistricting 
algorithm, then, is the choice of who should win and who should lose. 
This section examines who wins and who loses under the partisan 
gerrymander, the bipartisan gerrymander, and the competitive 
gerrymander. 
The Partisan Gerrymander 
The winners and losers of a partisan gerrymander are quite clear. 
A partisan gerrymander creates a systematic advantage for the party 
with efficiently distributed voters and a systematic disadvantage for 
the party with inefficiently distributed voters. On average, the 
advantaged party will win more seats than its proportion of the 
population, and the disadvantaged party will win fewer. 
By definition, a partisan gerrymander promotes bias, and the 
conventional wisdom about delegation of authority is that if partisan 
officials have the authority to redraw district lines, they will use the 
partisan algorithm. However, risk-averse partisan officials have 
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incentives to avoid a partisan gerrymander. After all, the plan works 
by creating thin majorities in as many districts as possible, which 
creates the risk that a small but consistent shift in public opinion 
towards the disadvantaged party will cost the offending party a large 
number of seats.2 Nonetheless, the sole purpose here is to examine 
who wins and who loses under each plan. 
The Bipartisan Gerrymander 
Suppose that the electorate of a state is divided between M voters 
affiliated with Party A and N voters affiliated with Party B. Suppose 
further that the state must be divided into d districts. Presuming even 
divisibility, the extreme bipartisan gerrymander would create 
d(M/(M+N)) districts in which all voters are affiliated with Party A, 
and d(N/(M+N)) districts in which all voters are affiliated with Party 
B. The incumbents are clear winners under this algorithm because 
each incumbent will represent a district in which all voters are 
affiliated with the incumbent’s party. Thus, incumbents will face no 
threat of loss in the general election. One might initially argue, then, 
that the losers are the incumbents’ general election opponents, but 
under such an extreme bipartisan gerrymander, there would be no 
general election opponents. In the d(M/(M+N)) districts in which all 
voters are affiliated with Party A, there are no voters affiliated with 
Party B, so given residency requirements, there will be no candidates 
of Party B in such districts. Hence, among general election candidates, 
there are no losers. Similarly, there are essentially no losers among the 
electorate because all voters will be represented by a legislator of 
their own party. Thomas Brunell argues that this alone is sufficient 
reason to enact bipartisan gerrymanders.3 
Of course, there can be no perfect bipartisan gerrymander. Any 
 
 2. See, e.g., Howard Scarrow, The Impact of Reapportionment on Party Representation in 
the State of New York, 9 POL’Y STUD. J. 937, 939–40 (1981) (“If there are a large number of 
districts which are closely matched (e.g., won by margins of 51%–49%), the chances are that all 
of them will alternate each election as party fortunes ebb and flow.  The high 
disproportionalities which would result each year would then stem not from partisan bias in the 
apportionment-districting system, but . . . from the extreme sensitivity of these districts to 
changes in voter preferences.”). 
 3. THOMAS L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION:  WHY COMPETITIVE 
ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA (2008) [hereinafter BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND 
REPRESENTATION]; Thomas L. Brunell, Rethinking Redistricting: How Drawing Uncompetitive 
Districts Eliminates Gerrymanders, Enhances Representation, and Improves Attitudes Towards 
Congress, 40 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 77, 83 (2006). 
DO NOT DELETE 6/9/2010  5:45:27 PM 
22 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 5:17 
 
attempt at a bipartisan gerrymander inevitably will place some voters 
in districts in which the overwhelming majority of voters disagree 
with them. The result will be regular elections in which the majority 
party incumbent regularly defeats a minority party sacrificial lamb, 
and the losers are the misplaced minority party voters, minority party 
candidates, and potential candidates who do not even bother to run 
because they are certain to lose. Advocates of evenly-balanced 
districts might argue that while balanced districts will create more 
losers by imposing a victor on a larger minority,4 evenly-balanced 
districts are preferable because nobody is relegated to the status of 
permanent loser. Whether or not we accept that claim will affect our 
preference between bipartisan and competitive gerrymanders, but the 
purpose of the analysis here is simply to describe the winners and 
losers under each redistricting algorithm, and bipartisan 
gerrymanders produce few losers in partisan terms, and the degree to 
which they do produce losers is simply a function of insufficient 
district homogeneity, not insufficient district heterogeneity. 
Opponents of bipartisan gerrymanders argue that such 
gerrymanders promote legislative polarization by forcing legislators 
to remain responsive to non-centrist primary electorates rather than 
centrist general electorates. To the degree that this is true, ideological 
extremists are the electoral winners under a bipartisan gerrymander, 
and ideological centrists are the losers because they will be left 
without representation. This claim leads to one of the most common 
arguments against bipartisan gerrymanders: if most voters are not 
ideologically extreme and bipartisan gerrymanders promote 
polarization, then bipartisan gerrymanders create more losers than 
winners by giving extremists disproportionately large representation 
in Congress and by giving centrists disproportionately little 
representation. 
However, the effect of such gerrymanders on legislative 
polarization is measurable and, indeed, small.5 This consistent 
 
 4. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 3, at 96. 
 5. Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander & Matthew Gunning, Incumbency, Redistricting, 
and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75, 79 (2006); Thomas L. 
Brunell & Bernard Grofman, Evaluating the Impact of Redistricting on District Homogeneity, 
Political Competition, and Political Extremism in the House of Representatives, 1962–2006, in 
DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 117, 133–34 (Margaret Levi, James Johnson, Jack 
Knight & Susan Stokes eds., 2008); Buchler, The Redistricting Process, supra note 1, at 166–70; 
Justin Buchler, Redistricting Reform Will Not Solve California’s Budget Crisis, 1 CAL. J. POL & 
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empirical finding is puzzling to some because blaming 
gerrymandering has such intuitive appeal. The House of 
Representatives has become dramatically more polarized over time. 
Figures 1 through 14 below show DW-NOMINATE6 scores for each 
House of Representatives elected in a presidential election year from 
1952 to 2004.7 
Figures 1–14 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
POL’Y, 1, 14–15 (2009) [hereinafter Buchler, Redistricting Reform]; Nolan McCarty, Keith T. 
Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI., 
666, 672 (2009); Seth Masket, Jon Winburn & Gerald C. Wright, The Limits of the 
Gerrymander: Examining the Impact of Redistricting on Electoral Competition and Legislative 
Polarization 20 (May 18, 2006) (delivered at the Sixth Annual Conference on State Politics and 
Policy), available at 
http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/political_science/state_politics/conferences/2006/ 
Papers/Masket_Winburn_Wright_Lubbock2006.pdf. 
 6. DW-NOMINATE scores are estimates of legislators’ locations in an ideological space 
calculated based on their roll call votes. 
 7. The first dimension of a NOMINATE score represents a legislator’s degree of 
liberalism or conservatism, with negative scores indicating liberalism, and positive scores 
indicating conservatism. Scores are computed by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal and are 
available at http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm. 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 9 
 
Figure 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 
 
Figure 12 
 
Figure 13 
 
Figure 14 
 
 
These graphs indicate that the House of Representatives became 
dramatically more polarized over the course of the post-WWII 
period. Further, conventional wisdom holds that state legislatures 
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have become increasingly sophisticated in their approach to 
redistricting, allowing them to systematically eliminate competitive 
legislative districts in order to protect incumbents through bipartisan 
gerrymandering. Eliminating competitive districts takes away the 
threat that legislators might lose a general election. Hence, electoral 
pressures force legislators to move towards ideological extremes in 
order to win primaries. To many, the intuition is so clear that the idea 
it is wrong seems inconceivable.  However, two pieces of information 
explain why so many empirical studies have demonstrated that 
bipartisan gerrymandering is not responsible for polarization. First, 
the disappearance of competitive districts over time is, itself, a myth.8 
Figure 15 shows the proportion of U.S. House districts in which the 
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates were separated 
by less than ten points in the two party vote, for every election from 
1952 to 2004. These districts should be the most competitive, and a 
competitive gerrymander would maximize the number of such 
districts. 
Figure 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The first significant hole in the argument linking legislative 
polarization to bipartisan gerrymanders should be apparent. The 
 
 8. Buchler, The Redistricting Process, supra note 1, at 170; see also Buchler, Redistricting 
Reform, supra note 6, at 4 (“In order for the disappearance of marginal districts to explain the 
increase in legislative polarization over time, marginal districts would have to disappear over 
time. They didn’t.”). 
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trend towards polarization in Figures 1 through 14 can only be 
explained by the disappearance of competitive districts if those 
districts did, indeed, disappear. Figure 15 demonstrates that the 
number of competitive districts has not declined. The number of 
competitive districts has fluctuated, but ironically, there were slightly 
more competitive districts in 2004 than in 1952, despite the 
dramatically higher levels of polarization in the 109th Congress than 
in the 83rd Congress. Throughout the post-WWII period, most 
districts have not been competitive. Despite that, Congress managed 
to avoid dramatic polarization up to the 1980s and 1990s, thereby 
demonstrating that having a relatively small number of competitive 
districts does not produce polarization. Further, because polarization 
increased without a consistent decline in the number of competitive 
districts, polarization in the House of Representatives cannot be 
explained by  bipartisan gerrymanders. Moreover, reconciling the 
polarization of the 109th Congress (as shown in Figure 14) with the 
observation that nearly a quarter of all districts in 2004 saw a spread 
of less than ten points between President George W. Bush and 
Senator John Kerry demonstrates that even competitive districts do 
not elect moderates in the modern era. Polarization is not the result of 
bipartisan gerrymanders, and it would persist regardless of how 
district lines are drawn. 
The second critical piece of evidence that polarization is not the 
result of bipartisan gerrymandering is that the same trend towards 
polarization is visible in the Senate.  Figures 16 through 29 show 
Senate ideology scores for the same period of time. 
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Figures 16–29 
 
Figure 16 
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Figure 22 
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Figure 28 
 
Figure 29 
 
 
The same trend towards polarization visible in the House of 
Representatives is evident in the Senate as well. Because redistricting 
is not a factor in Senate elections, it follows that whatever is causing 
centrists to be electoral losers, it is not redistricting. However intuitive 
the redistricting argument may be, the consistent empirical result is 
that bipartisan gerrymanders do not dictate that extremists win and 
centrists lose. For whatever reason, that happens in the modern 
political environment anyway. The losers under a bipartisan 
gerrymander are simply those who are placed in the “wrong” districts: 
the small number of Republicans who reside in heavily Democratic 
urban districts, and the small number of Democrats who reside in 
heavily Republican rural and suburban districts. 
The Competitive Gerrymander 
To many advocates of “good government” reform, a competitive 
gerrymander is a “fair” redistricting plan. In a sense, the winners and 
losers in a competitive gerrymander are less obvious than the winners 
and losers under the other two gerrymanders. If the parties are evenly 
divided within a state, then a competitive gerrymander does not 
provide any ex ante advantage to either party. Thus, voters of neither 
party are intrinsically disadvantaged. Moreover, incumbents do not 
have any built-in protection from general election challenges, nor do 
they face an intrinsically hostile environment. The appeal of the 
competitive gerrymander is that if every seat is “up for grabs,” then 
everybody is treated, in some sense, equally. Hence, while elections 
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will always have winners and losers, a competitive gerrymander does 
not preordain specific winners and losers. 
However, even though a competitive gerrymander does not 
determine who the specific winners and losers will be, it can have 
other pernicious effects because of how winners and losers will be 
determined in such a plan. The previous section demonstrated that 
bipartisan gerrymanders are not responsible for polarization. But, for 
the sake of argument, let us assume that “good government” 
advocates were correct to argue that competitive districts promote 
centrism. If so, then the winners under the competitive gerrymander 
would be centrists and the losers would be extremists. Although there 
is intuitive appeal to that spread, the representational consequences 
of that pattern depend on the degree to which the population actually 
is centrist. 
If voters can be characterized by ideal points in a single policy 
dimension, and elections function in the way that reformers assume, 
then a competitive gerrymander promotes ideological centrism in the 
legislature by drawing district lines such that each district has a 
centrist median voter. However, when there are a significant number 
of non-centrists in the population, centrist outcomes will leave many 
without any representation in Congress. Further, the population need 
not be as bimodal as Congress for us to be bothered by the lack of 
representation for ideological non-centrists. Consider two possible 
population distributions as depicted in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Both distributions have a median location of 0, but the 
distribution with a standard deviation of 0.4 is much more tightly 
clustered around that median than the distribution with a standard 
deviation of 2. If the population looks more like the distribution with 
a 0.4 standard deviation, then most of the population will be happy 
with an electoral system that promotes centrism because most of the 
population is centrist. However, if the population looks more like the 
distribution with a standard deviation of 2, then a redistricting plan 
that forces all legislators to be centrist will leave many more voters 
dissatisfied with their representatives. After all, there is greater 
average ideological distance between voters and the median location 
in the distribution with a standard deviation of 2 than with a standard 
deviation of 0.4. Moreover, empirical findings demonstrate that 
voters’ satisfaction with their representatives is due more to the 
perceived differences between their own preferences and the 
positions of their representatives than to the degree of electoral 
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competition.9 Thus, even if the reformist argument that competitive 
gerrymanders make winners out of the centrists is accepted, wide 
swaths of the population will become “losers” because they will be 
left without representation. 
However, the consistent finding that the reformist argument about 
competition and polarization is wrong cannot be ignored. 
Redistricting has played only a minor role in the polarization that has 
developed in Congress over the last two decades, as discussed earlier. 
So, if polarization is inevitable regardless of how district lines are 
drawn, what does that imply about losers in the competitive 
gerrymander? Suppose a state consists of voters whose ideologies 
form a Normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation 
of 2, as in Figure 30. If so, a competitive gerrymander would simply 
make each district a microcosm of the state.10 Even if the winning 
candidate in such a district maximizes voter satisfaction by adopting a 
location of 0, the result is still a relatively dissatisfied electorate 
because so many voters are ideologically distant from the winner. 
However, if the winning candidate adopts a polarized location, voter 
dissatisfaction is even greater because average ideological distance 
between voters and their representative increases. Thus, if polarization 
is a given based on the empirical observation that even competitive 
districts now elect non-centrists, then a competitive gerrymander 
actually dictates that most of the electorate will be losers, although it 
does not dictate which specific narrow segment will be winners. 
Alternatively a bipartisan gerrymander by definition creates more 
homogeneous constituencies with voters more tightly clustered 
around the mean. Thus, the bipartisan gerrymander necessarily 
creates fewer losers. The cost is simply that the losers in a bipartisan 
gerrymander are predetermined by the redistricting algorithm rather 
than by election results that will inevitably leave most voters 
dissatisfied. 
DELEGATION VS. ALGORITHM 
The preceding analysis reveals that there is no such thing as an 
 
 9. Thomas L. Brunell & Justin Buchler, Ideological Representation and Competitive 
Congressional Elections, 28 ELECTORAL STUD. 448, 454 (2009). 
 10. Justin Buchler, Competition, Representation and Redistricting: The Case Against 
Competitive Congressional Districts, 17 J. THEORETICAL POL. 431, 440 (2005). 
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apolitical redistricting plan.11 Every plan creates winners and losers, 
and the choice of redistricting plans involves inevitable tradeoffs 
between worthy goals.12 The partisan plan dictates that the winners 
will be the voters and candidates of the party implementing the plan, 
and that the losers will be the voters and candidates of the 
disadvantaged party. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the bipartisan 
plan does not dictate that extremists win and that centrists lose. 
Instead, the winners under the bipartisan plan are incumbents and 
“correctly” placed voters, whereas the losers are voters and 
candidates who reside in districts in which they are a small minority. 
The competitive plan does not dictate winners ex ante, as the partisan 
and bipartisan plans do, but it leaves large swaths of the electorate as 
losers anyway. After all, because polarization among candidates 
occurs in evenly-balanced districts as well as in heavily partisan 
districts, the losers in a competitive plan are not just the nearly 50% 
of voters forced to accept victory by candidates for whom they did not 
vote, but also the potentially significant majority forced to accept 
representation by officials with distant ideologies. All redistricting 
plans create winners and losers, so all are deserving of the pejorative 
labels of “political” or “gerrymander.” 
The choice of delegation, then, must be equally political. The 
choice to delegate redistricting authority to the state legislature is a 
decision that will potentially result in a partisan, or more likely, a 
bipartisan gerrymander. After all, most involved in the redistricting 
process are aware that the Republicans’ attempt to gerrymander New 
York after the 1972 election backfired in 1974,13 so the well-known 
risks associated with a partisan gerrymander make the bipartisan 
 
 11. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for 
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 677–78 
(2002) (“Redistricting cannot be truly randomized or automated . . . . [B]ecause such neutral 
principles uniformly applied by automated redistricting will have predictable effects in a given 
demographic context, political officials that choose among those principles can inject their bias 
at an earlier stage of the redistricting ‘process.’”). 
 12. DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE E. CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE 
AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 90 (Bruce Nichols ed., 1992); see also Richard G. Niemi, 
The Effects of Districting on Tradeoffs Among Party Competition, Electoral Responsiveness, and 
Seats-Votes Relationships, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES (Bernard 
Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert B. McKay & Howard A. Scarrow eds., 1982); Richard G. 
Niemi & John Deegan, Jr., A Theory of Political Districting, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1304, 1312 
(1978). 
 13. Scarrow, supra note 2, at 943. 
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gerrymander more appealing to the risk-averse. Those still concerned 
with the threat of a partisan gerrymander could simply add a 
supermajority requirement for passage of a redistricting plan, steering 
the process away from a partisan gerrymander and towards a 
bipartisan gerrymander. The choice to delegate redistricting authority 
to an independent commission charged with creating evenly-balanced 
districts is indistinguishable from choosing a competitive 
gerrymander, as is the decision to allow independently submitted 
plans to be scored mechanically in a way that favors creation of 
competitive districts. Any delegation decision affects the plan that will 
be chosen, so any delegation decision simultaneously creates winners 
and losers. One might reasonably argue that a competitive 
gerrymander is preferable to a bipartisan gerrymander on the 
grounds that even though the competitive gerrymander creates more 
losers, it is better not to relegate anyone to the status of permanent 
loser, as the bipartisan gerrymander does. Nonetheless, this choice 
necessarily creates winners and losers and is therefore undeniably 
political. 
PROCESS VS. OUTCOME 
This essay has examined redistricting purely from the perspective 
of outcomes—specifically winners and losers. Of course, redistricting 
algorithms and delegation decisions can be judged by other criteria, 
such as the degree to which they promote political participation, civic 
engagement, policy-centered debate, responsiveness of policy over 
time to shifts in public opinion, or any other such outcome. However, 
the remaining question is whether or not a redistricting process can 
be evaluated independently of outcomes. 
Consider the game of Nomic.14 Nomic is essentially a game about 
making rules. Play generally consists of proposing changes to the rules 
of Nomic, and more circularly, changes to rules about changing the 
rules of Nomic. The game is a philosophical exercise motivated by the 
question of whether rules about rulemaking can be changed, or 
whether doing so intrinsically violates initial rules. It is the epitome of 
process for the sake of process, and it can be so because the outcome 
of a game of Nomic is utterly irrelevant. In fact, in most iterations of 
 
 14. PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT 362 (1982). 
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the game, the rules of the game will be rewritten such that there are 
no outcomes other than the creation or modification of rules of the 
game. 
Changing the process for redistricting is a literal case of changing 
the rules by which electoral rules are written. In principle, that can be 
done in a manner that does not consider electoral outcomes, as 
though the process of redistricting were nothing more than a game of 
Nomic. However, unlike Nomic, legislative elections have outcomes 
that matter. Legislative election results determine who will pass laws 
about war and peace, healthcare, and other issues involving matters of 
life and death. District lines determine legislative election results. 
Redistricting algorithms determine district lines, and those delegated 
with redistricting authority choose redistricting algorithms. Hence, 
both the algorithms we use to draw district lines and the decisions we 
make about who should have the authority to choose them have 
critical social and policy consequences that sometimes involve life and 
death. Such matters are too important to turn electoral rulemaking 
into an exercise in Nomic by evaluating redistricting processes 
independently of electoral outcomes. Allowing the redistricting 
process to devolve into Nomic would be harmless frivolity at best, and 
fundamentally dangerous at worst because legislative election 
outcomes are of such critical importance. 
 
